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Opportunities for financial reporting fraud arise because of information asymmetries—often 
labeled “lack of transparency”—between top managers and their diverse shareholders. We 
evaluate the relative contributions of information asymmetries arising from industry-level and 
firm-level complexities to the likelihood of top managers committing financial reporting fraud. 
Using a sample of 453 matched pairs of firms that have and have not been identified as having 
committed financial reporting fraud, we found that information asymmetries arising from industry- 
and firm-level complexities increase the likelihood of financial fraud. Moreover, more CEO 
stock options increase the likelihood of fraud when industry complexity is high, while aggressive 
monitoring by the audit committee reduces the likelihood of reporting fraud when firm-level 
complexity is high.
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Chief executive officers (CEOs) of well-known U.S. firms such as WorldCom (Farzad, 
2005), Tyco International (Eichenwald, 2005), and Adelphia Communications (Fabrikant, 
2005) have been convicted of financial reporting fraud. Likewise, international firm CEOs 
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such as Calisto Tanzi of Italy’s Parmalat (BBC News, 2008) and Ramalinga Raju of India’s 
Satyam Computer Services have been accused of or admitted to reporting fraudulent finan-
cial information (Timmons & Wassener, 2009). The societal cost of this worldwide spate 
of financial reporting fraud has led researchers and regulators to call for a fundamental 
reexamination of corporate governance and regulation (e.g., O’Connor, Priem, Coombs, & 
Gilley, 2006; Paulson, 2007; Zhang, Bartol, Smith, Pfarrer, & Khanin, 2008).
Financial reporting fraud requires three simultaneous circumstances: the opportunity to 
deceive, a motive for doing so, and willingness on the part of the perpetrator (Snyder, Priem, 
& Harris, 2009). Opportunity is foremost among these circumstances, because without an 
opportunity even the most highly motivated and willing potential perpetrator cannot commit 
fraud. In short, opportunity is a necessary precondition for fraud. Agency theorists have 
shown that the CEO role is especially conducive to such opportunities, because the wide-
spread separation of ownership from firm control contributes to goal and information asym-
metries between the CEOs who control firms and their shareholders (Berle & Means, 1932). 
Given divergence in the goals of top managers (as agents) and those of shareholders (the 
principals), without intervention CEOs have the opportunity to engage in self-serving behav-
iors detrimental to shareholders (1) because the CEOs know more about their firms’ 
resources and operations than do their shareholders and (2) because the relationship between 
CEOs’ behaviors and the resulting outcomes often is not clearly visible to the dispersed 
shareholders (Berle & Means, 1932; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Zajac & Westphal, 1994). 
When shareholders lack such key information, CEOs are subject to moral hazard because 
they can engage in self-serving behavior with relative impunity (Richardson, 2000). CEO-
shareholder information asymmetry, therefore, provides CEOs with the opportunity to 
engage in detrimental actions ranging from simple shirking, to enjoying unnecessary perqui-
sites, to eschewing high-return high-risk strategies, to our focus—financial reporting fraud.
Financial reporting fraud by CEOs represents an arguably distinct escalation of detri-
mental behavior when compared to performance-reducing shirking or even under-aggressive 
risk taking. Financial reporting fraud is a moral hazard problem that occurs in the first 
instance because of information asymmetry between CEOs and shareholders. Yet given the 
central role of information asymmetry in agency theory, surprisingly little research attention 
has been paid to differences in the likely degrees of CEO-shareholder information asym-
metry arising from differing sources or across differing contexts, or to how such differences 
might affect the potential for fraudulent financial reporting or the effectiveness of various 
governance mechanisms in preventing it. These issues are particularly important given the 
findings that some residual CEO-shareholder goal misalignment remains even in firms with 
aggressive stock options incentive structures (Devers, Cannella, Reilly, & Yoder, 2007).
Management research to date has focused primarily on the motive for committing finan-
cial reporting fraud, and particularly on the potential of stock option incentive compensation 
to encourage reporting higher-than-actual financial performance. Studies examining CEO 
compensation and financial reporting fraud indicate that large stock option incentives, espe-
cially, may motivate CEOs to misreport financial results. For example, the likelihood of 
financial misconduct increases with a higher percentage of CEO compensation received 
from stock option grants (Harris & Bromiley, 2007), with a greater amount of “out of the 
money” CEO stock options (Zhang et al., 2008), and when boards of directors (BoDs) also 
have incentive compensation plans (O’Connor et al., 2006). Thus, incentive-aligning stock 
option compensation intended to reduce agency monitoring costs and improve firm perfor-
mance may, when taken to extremes, instead promote financial reporting fraud (Desai, 
Hogan, & Wilkins, 2006; see Armstrong, Jagolinzer, & Larcker, 2010, for a contrary view).
Despite the burgeoning management literature on CEO fraud, the contribution of a key 
antecedent condition that provides managers with the opportunity to engage in fraud—
information asymmetry—has yet to be examined empirically. We address this issue first by 
examining the relative effects of CEO-shareholder information asymmetries resulting from 
differences in firm-level and industry-level structural complexities on the likelihood of 
fraudulent financial reporting. We then argue that a CEO will be more likely to seize the 
financial fraud opportunity afforded by a given level and source of information asymmetry 
when higher stock option ownership provides motivation for the CEO to engage in fraud. On 
the other hand, even motivated CEOs will be less likely to seize an asymmetry-driven fraud 
opportunity when monitoring of the firm’s financial reporting is stringent, because such 
monitoring reduces opportunity and thereby decreases the CEO’s willingness to attempt a 
fraudulent report.
We contribute to the corporate governance literature by building theory regarding how 
the extremely detrimental behavior of a CEO’s fraudulent financial reporting can result from 
the CEO’s opportunity to engage in fraud. Our findings indicate that having the opportunity 
afforded by information asymmetry may be all that is necessary for some CEOs to engage 
in fraudulent financial reporting. Thus, our findings point to the need to examine potential 
industry- and firm-level sources of information asymmetries that could promote opportunis-
tic, “non-strategic” actions by CEOs. Furthermore, although information asymmetry by 
itself appears to be a sufficient condition for financial reporting fraud, the motivation pro-
vided by stock options, in some instances, enhances the propensity of CEOs to engage in 
fraud, while stringent monitoring reduces such propensity.
Our paper proceeds as follows: First, we review the relevant literature on information 
asymmetry, moral hazard, and agency theory, focusing on how these factors are related to 
fraudulent financial reporting. Next, we develop theory and hypotheses on why firm- and 
industry-based complexities are expected to increase information asymmetry and therefore 
the probability of financial reporting fraud. Further, we explain how stock options and audit 
committee monitoring likely affect the primary information asymmetry–financial fraud rela-
tionship. Our hypotheses are tested on a matched-pair sample of firms that have versus have 
not been publicly reported by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for financial 
fraud. We conclude with a discussion of our results and their implications for future research 
and practice.
Theoretical Background and Hypotheses
Agency theory has been the dominant theoretical lens used to examine corporate govern-
ance (Dalton, Hitt, Certo, & Dalton, 2008). A central premise of agency theory is that when 
the interests of agents and principals conflict, an agent may take actions that are not in the 
best interests of the principals (Eisenhardt, 1989). Moreover, when the quality of an agent’s 
actions is not easily verified by principals, the agent may engage in self-serving behavior 
with relative impunity (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). This agency problem is especially impor-
tant for corporate governance, because firms’ top managers have more and better informa-
tion about the firms they lead than do owners, thereby allowing managers to pursue strategic 
actions that may disproportionally benefit management at the expense of stockholders. Such 
activity might include unnecessarily growing the firm through joint ventures (Reuer & 
Ragozzino, 2006), expanding internationally (Sanders & Carpenter, 1998), or expanding 
into new lines of business (Boyd, Gove, & Hitt, 2005; Denis, Denis, & Sarin, 1999), wherein 
the growth goal increases the top manager’s power and salary but simultaneously reduces 
returns to shareholders.
The primary prescription offered to curb such goal misalignment between top managers 
and shareholders has been the purposeful distribution of firm equity to top managers (Dalton 
et al., 2008; Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama & Jensen, 1983a, 1983b; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Scholars (and practitioners) argue that the goal alignment of owners and management 
increases with the distribution of equity to executives, which consequently decreases the 
likelihood of managerial financial misconduct (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Eaton & Rosen, 
1983; Eisenhardt, 1988; Hall & Liebman, 1998; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Practitioners 
have widely adopted contingent stock-based incentive compensation as a means to align the 
interests of managers with those of shareholders and, thus, encourage managerial actions 
that benefit shareholders (Westphal & Zajac, 1995). While the practice of conferring contin-
gent equity incentive compensation is now prevalent, accounting for in excess of 50% of 
CEO compensation (Sanders & Hambrick, 2007), empirical research does not clearly sup-
port a relationship with subsequent firm performance (Dalton, Daily, Certo, & Roengpitya, 
2003; Sundaramurthy, Rhoades, & Rechner, 2005).
A contrary viewpoint has recently been offered by scholars who argue that excesses in 
stock-based incentive compensation can have the unintended effect of motivating some 
CEOs to use overly aggressive accounting practices (Desai et al., 2006) or to misreport firm 
financial results to the SEC (O’Connor et al., 2006) in order to artificially “prop up” earnings 
and thereby ensure incentive compensation is received. Such financial misconduct by 
executives violates shareholder trust and ultimately reduces value to shareholders. Three 
recent studies focusing on the effects of compensation policy on financial reporting fraud 
exemplify this stream.
O’Connor et al. (2006) suggested an “unprincipled agent” view of incentive stock options 
used for corporate governance. They found that large stock option grants to CEOs actually 
increased the probability of fraudulent reporting in their sample if other directors also held 
stock options in the presence of CEO duality, although they reduced the probability of 
fraudulent reporting if the CEO was not the board chair and other directors did not hold 
options. Similarly, Harris and Bromiley (2007) used behavioral theories to argue that lower 
prior performance and negative performance relative to peers also increased the probability 
of fraudulent financial reporting. And Zhang et al. (2008) found that CEOs were more likely 
to misstate earnings when they had more out-of-the money stock options and less stock 
ownership. Thus, empirical evidence suggests a relationship between variable compensation 
and financial reporting fraud.
Although evidence suggests a relationship between variable compensation and financial 
reporting fraud, the nature of this relationship is unclear. The use of variable compensation 
is an agency theory prescription to deal with potential managerial moral hazard behavior 
(Dalton et al., 2008; Eisenhardt, 1989). The potential of this moral hazard results from the 
information asymmetry that exists between shareholders and managers, and thus, informa-
tion asymmetry is a primary driver of the use of variable compensation for managers (Healy 
& Palepu, 2001). Similarly, financial reporting fraud occurs when information asymmetry 
provides CEOs with the opportunity to engage in self-serving behavior. Information asym-
metry therefore is a key driver of both compensation design (Healy & Palepu, 2001) and 
financial reporting fraud (Richardson, 2000). Understanding the role of information asym-
metry in providing CEOs with the opportunity to engage in financial reporting fraud is 
necessary to fully uncover the antecedents to financial reporting fraud.
The Fundamental Role of Information Asymmetry
Although management research has shown that CEO compensation structure can influ-
ence malfeasance, empirical tests generally have assumed or ignored the necessary anteced-
ent condition for such behavior—information asymmetry. A result of the separation of 
ownership and control in the modern corporation, “insiders” such as top managers have 
considerably more knowledge and understanding about a firm’s operations than do outsiders 
such as shareholders (Seyhun, 1986, 1990). For example, top managers can directly observe 
and control resources (He & Wang, 2009), while shareholders cannot. Moreover, managers 
can make changes in investment schemes, and only the most significant of these (e.g., cer-
tain acquisitions or dispositions) require the consent of shareholders.
The existence of information asymmetry between top managers and shareholders contrib-
utes to a moral hazard risk for shareholders. That is, information asymmetry results in the 
potential for post-contract opportunism by top managers, such that managers can take self-
serving actions that are harmful but also opaque to shareholders (Arrow, 1968). Two kinds 
of moral hazard arise due to the manager-shareholder information asymmetry problem. The 
first involves the relative opacity of the actions, behaviors, and effort exerted by top manag-
ers. Because shareholders cannot directly observe top management behaviors, nor are cause-
effect relationships in the firm clear, they cannot tie actions to specific outcomes. Thus, 
managers can engage in activities that benefit themselves to the detriment of shareholders 
with relative impunity. The second moral hazard problem is hidden knowledge or informa-
tion. Top managers have access to information about the firm’s operations that is not avail-
able to shareholders. This is especially true of performance information. Although managers 
must disclose performance information to shareholders, that information is highly distilled, 
incomplete, and subject to manipulation (Desai et al., 2006). And when outcomes are not 
objective and must be communicated by management, the linkage between management 
actions and shareholder benefits can be even more obscure.
Several factors beyond the characteristics of the principal-agent relationship also contrib-
ute to the degree of information asymmetry facing shareholders in particular contexts. For 
example, the tacit nature of much management knowledge (Kogut & Zander, 1992; Teece, 
Pisano, & Shuen, 1997) also contributes to information asymmetry. Managers develop in-depth, 
tacit understandings of a firm’s resources through continual attempts at resource exploitation 
and development. Shareholders, in contrast, surrender control to management and, in so 
doing, distance themselves from the firm and thereby sacrifice any possibility for tacit 
understandings of daily activities. The only information shareholders usually have regarding 
a firm’s operations consists of highly distilled, secondary data provided by regulatory fil-
ings, media reports, and security analysts (Williamson, 1979). In short, differences in prox-
imity and experience also are sources of manager-shareholder knowledge asymmetries.
Another source of information asymmetries is in the level of complexity found in the firm 
and its industry. Complexity reduces transparency and increases uncertainty about actions 
and their outcomes (Anderson, 1999; Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997). The competition underly-
ing industries can be considered as either more complex or more discrete (Levin et al., 
1987). Complex industries have more components that account for success (Heeley, 
Matusik, & Jain, 2007), and in more complex industries the links between resources, com-
petition, and performance are not direct, linear, or transparent. Analysts, investors, and other 
stakeholders therefore find it difficult to make a link between resources, competitive activ-
ity, and the performance of firms in complex industries. Firms competing in complex indus-
tries thus have higher levels of information asymmetry between managers and investors than 
do firms in less complex industries (Heeley et al., 2007). Conversely, firms in less complex, 
discrete technology industries have products with standard, well-known technologies, and 
the links between resources, competitive activity, and performance are more easily dis-
cerned. Firms in discrete industries have less information asymmetry with outsiders because 
it is easier for outsiders to make appropriate connections between activities (behaviors) and 
outcomes (performance). In sum, since operations within firms in complex industries are not 
transparent and it is difficult for external parties to make important connections between 
activities and performance, there is greater information asymmetry between shareholders 
and managers of firms in complex industries. Heeley et al. (2007), for example, found more 
underpricing of securities in complex industries as a result of greater information asymmetry.
Complexity also exists at the firm level. Organizational complexity occurs due to the dif-
ficulties arising from managing large numbers of organizational resources, routines, pro-
cesses, and steps in the production of goods and services (Reed & DeFillippi, 1990). 
Organizational complexity becomes greater with the recombination, extension, or replica-
tion of a firm’s existing routines, operations, and resources (Nelson & Winter, 1982). As the 
numbers of parts, processes, and routines increase within an organization, the quantity and 
diversity of information necessary makes decision making more cognitively difficult and 
costly (Mesquita & Brush, 2008). Organizational complexity therefore increases through the 
expansion of product lines and markets (Slevin & Covin, 1997). As a result, the more diver-
sified a firm, the greater is its organizational complexity (Mishina, Pollock, & Porac, 2004). 
Greater information asymmetry exists between managers and outsiders of more diversified 
companies for several reasons. First, increases in organizational complexity may lead to 
behavioral opportunism because it is easier for management to obscure and distort internal 
operations so that external parties have difficulty making “cause and effect” attributions 
(Williamson, 1985: 57). Second, because only the financial information of the parent entity 
is released, it is possible for management to shift costs and revenues across units to smooth 
performance (Trueman & Titman, 1988) and thereby hide action-performance relationships. 
Third, because the most advertised benefit of diversification is synergy, the firm’s perfor-
mance is not expected to be simply the sum of its parts. This provides an additional gray area 
that obscures the links between management actions and firm performance. In sum, the more 
diversified a firm, the greater the information asymmetry between managers and sharehold-
ers, the less visible the actions of management, and the more opportunity managers have to 
engage in malfeasance.
We have argued that the more difficult it is for shareholders to observe management 
behavior, the greater is the opportunity for top management to engage in fraudulent behavior 
such as earnings manipulation without fear of discovery. Conversely, if management actions 
are more easily observable by shareholders, even top managers who are highly motivated 
and willing to engage in malfeasance are unlikely to do so because of the high likelihood of 
being discovered. Therefore, increases in complexity-based information asymmetries 
obscure self-interested top management behaviors and thereby increase the probability of 
financial reporting fraud. Thus,
Hypothesis 1 (H1): The level of complexity-based information asymmetry between a firm’s top 
managers and shareholders is positively related to the likelihood of fraudulent financial report-
ing by the firm’s top managers.
The Moderating Role of Incentives
Stock options have been used as a common means for aligning top managers’ goals with 
those of shareholders and thereby mitigating the agent-principal goal misalignment problem. 
Because the value of managers’ stock options–based compensation increases when their 
firms’ stock prices increase, top managers with enough stock option compensation will vig-
orously pursue their shareholders’ goal of stock price appreciation. Excessive stock options 
can, however, have the unintended effect of increasing top managers’ propensity to inten-
tionally misstate their firms’ earnings, for two reasons. First, as stock options vest the time 
horizon of top managers is shortened, and they are likely to “overconsume” short-term 
rewards (Fama, 1980). That is, management can artificially inflate short-run earnings to 
influence the stock price, thereby maximizing near-term compensation. Second, stock 
options provide top managers with unlimited upside for potential gains while limiting down-
side loss potential to zero (Miller & Leiblein, 1996; Zhang et al., 2008). This gives man-
agement an incentive to seek excessive risk (Sanders, 2001) that can be detrimental to 
shareholders.
These arguments indicate that stock options can provide managers with incentives for 
misrepresenting their firms’ financial performance to boost near-term compensation (Harris 
& Bromiley, 2007) or to cover up risky bets gone wrong (O’Connor et al., 2006). Top man-
agers will be more likely to engage in financial reporting fraud when the easy opportunity 
afforded by information asymmetry occurs jointly with the motivation generated by higher 
stock options incentive compensation. Thus, even when the cloak of information asymmetry 
makes their actions less transparent, increasing stock options provide top managers with 
motivation that increases even further the likelihood that a CEO will fraudulently misstate 
firm financials.
Hypothesis 2 (H2): CEO Stock options strengthen the effect of complexity-based information 
asymmetry on the likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting by a firm’s top managers.
The Moderating Role of Monitoring
Monitoring through an aggressive BoD is one of the more widely emphasized non-
compensation-based mechanisms for mitigating undesirable agency behaviors by top man-
agers (Dalton et al., 2008). A motivated and aggressive board is better able to observe 
management’s behavior and to identify needed information about a firm’s operations and 
performance (Eisenhardt, 1989). Such aggressive, effective monitoring by an engaged board 
generates the information needed to reduce the fundamental, complexity-based information 
asymmetry that causes moral hazard problems. As a result, we expect that the degree of 
board aggressiveness increases monitoring effectiveness and thereby mitigates agency-
based moral hazard problems. For a given level of complexity-driven information asymme-
try, aggressive monitoring by the board decreases a CEO’s opportunity to engage in 
fraudulent activities.
Most important board decisions and activities take place at the committee level (Kesner, 
1988). Since the agency behavior we focus on in this article is financial reporting fraud, the 
relevant board committee is the audit committee. The audit committee is ultimately respon-
sible for monitoring the financial reporting process of the firm (Klein, 2002). A vigilant and 
aggressive audit committee will be more likely to detect financial inaccuracies before they 
are reported. Therefore, although complexity-based information asymmetry may afford 
managers the opportunity to engage in fraud, the presence of an aggressive audit committee 
that effectively monitors firm financial reports will decrease the likelihood that financial 
misrepresentation will actually occur. Thus,
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Aggressive audit committee monitoring weakens the effect of complexity-based 
information asymmetry on the likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting by a firm’s top managers.
Methods
Company restatements of fraudulent financial reports are infrequent events, and there-
fore, the use of a matched-pair sample design was most appropriate for testing our hypoth-
eses (O’Connor et al., 2006). Such designs call for matching each firm that has experienced 
an infrequent event at a particular time with another, similar firm that did not experience the 
event at that time. The matching process itself controls for a number of possible differences 
in each pair of firms, in a manner similar to a repeated-measures regression, and we also 
controlled for endogeneity. We then used a conditional logistic regression (Agresti, 2002) 
that includes other statistical control variables to test for hypothesized differences across the 
paired firms. We describe our sampling, data collection, and analysis procedures more fully next.
Sample Selection
Our study focuses on firms that have engaged in financial reporting fraud. We used the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) 2006 report to Congress, which identified 948 
firms (1,360 instances) that restated their earnings due to severe accounting irregularities. 
This list consists of firms identified by the GAO and the SEC that restated earnings because 
of financial reporting fraud based upon auditors’ findings, company internal audits, and 
government inquiries. Firms on this list are identified as particularly egregious offenders as 
compared to the broad group of firms that had to restate earnings for more benign reasons 
such as accounting rule changes. Firms identified by the GAO and the SEC include compa-
nies such as Capital One, Tivo Inc., Sears Roebuck and Company, and Xerox. This was the 
most recent equivalent of the lists used to examine financial reporting fraud in the studies by 
Harris and Bromiley (2007) and Zhang et al. (2008). The GAO database does not include 
the specific years misstated, but it does report the company name, ticker, announcement 
date, and entity that prompted the restatement (e.g., auditor, company, SEC, unknown). To 
gather more data about the nature of the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles viola-
tions and which specific years were restated, we examined all amended annual or SEC 
reports (i.e., 10-K, 10-Q, or 8-K) for each firm on the GAO’s list to confirm the restatement 
and identify the period being restated. We identified amended annual reports for 618 firms 
that could be linked to the restatement identified by the SEC. We then used the CRSP, 
Compustat, and Execucomp databases to collect data on stock prices, firm financials, and top 
manager compensation. For firms not in these databases, we collected the information 
directly from their SEC filings. An additional 165 firms did not have any SEC (proxy) filings 
with Top Management Teams (TMT) compensation information. The final sample therefore 
included 453 firms that restated their earnings during this period and had complete informa-
tion. Because all the firms in sample had stock- and performance-based compensation for 
the period being restated, the CEOs benefitted financially from the misstated earnings.
Matching Procedure
Researchers have used matched-pair designs in other financial misconduct studies (e.g., 
Arthaud-Day, Certo, Dalton, & Dalton, 2006; Denis, Hanouna, & Sarin, 2006; Erickson, 
Hanlon, & Maydew, 2006; Harris & Bromiley, 2007; Kinney, Palmrose, & Scholz, 2004; 
O’Connor et al., 2006). We closely matched each firm that had been identified as restating 
previous, fraudulent financial reports with a similar but non-restating company, based pri-
marily on size and year of the fraudulent reporting. Similar to Harris and Bromiley (2007) 
and O’Connor et al. (2006), we restricted our matched-pair sample to publicly traded, U.S.-
based firms. Firms without complete information in the Compustat and Execucomp data-
bases or firms trading as American depositary receipts (ADRs) were not eligible to be 
matches for the misreporting firms. The matched firm for every restating firm consisted of 
the U.S. publicly traded firm closest in size (based on total assets) for the given year. Unlike 
Harris and Bromiley (2007) and O’Connor et al. (2006), however, our matching criteria did 
not include industry. This is because industry is one of the independent variables of interest 
in our study and is accounted for in the analyses. But with the exception of industry, our 
matching criteria are comparable to those used by Harris and Bromiley (2007) and O’Connor 
et al. (2006). All independent and control variables were measured for the year prior to the 
financial misstatement.
Dependent Variable
Restatement. Our dependent variable is whether the firm restated its earnings due to 
fraudulent accounting irregularities (as identified by the GAO 2006 report) between the 
years 2002 and 2005 inclusive. The restatement variable is binary and is coded as 1 if the 
firm was listed in the GAO report and 0 otherwise.
Independent Variables
We captured complexity-based information asymmetry using both an industry measure 
and a firm-level measure. Industry-level information asymmetry was measured using indus-
try complexity, while firm-level information asymmetry was captured through the degree of 
firm diversification.
Industry complexity. Industry complexity has historically been defined as the amount of 
heterogeneity present within an industry (Aldrich, 1979), which captures the uncertainty that 
arises as a result of intraindustry competition. We build on Dess and Beard’s (1984) model 
that captures heterogeneity in terms of industry concentration. Specifically, we operational-
ized industry complexity as the inverse of the industry four-firm concentration ratio. Highly 
concentrated industries are argued to have a high degree of strategic similarity because they 
contain a small number of relatively homogeneous firms (Miles, Snow, & Sharfman, 1993). 
Such industries, with fewer competitors, have more standardized norms of competition and 
impose fewer information burdens on competitors and external parties (Palmer & Wiseman, 
1999). Because all the participants are well versed with each other, these industries are less 
complex for managers and observers. Conversely, less concentrated industries have many 
heterogeneous participants, which results in increased competition and unpredictability. 
Such industries have high complexity due to increased information requirements for manag-
ers. Therefore, consistent with prior research (e.g., Boyd, 1995; Keats & Hitt, 1988; Palmer 
& Wiseman, 1999; Rasheed & Prescott, 1992), we calculated industry complexity as the 
inverse of the four-firm industry concentration ratio. Specifically, we first calculated the 
total sales of the industry by summing the sales of all firms in the industry listed in 
Compustat. Next, we identified the four largest firms, ranked by sales, in each industry. The 
four-firm concentration ratio was then calculated as the ratio of the sales of the four largest 
firms divided by the total industry sales. Essentially, this ratio is the proportion of sales in 
the industry accounted for by the four largest firms. The inverse of this ratio is our measure 
of industry complexity. We defined industries based on three-digit Standard Industry 
Classification (SIC) codes.
Firm complexity. Consistent with our theoretical discussion, we measured firm-level com-
plexity using a company diversification index. We calculated Palepu’s (1985) entropy-based 
diversification index using each company’s sales breakdowns as reported in Compustat.
Unexercised options. We identified the number of unexercised options owned by a CEO 
in a particular year, as reported in the firm’s annual 10-K report.
Board monitoring. We measured the board’s ability to effectively monitor financial report-
ing by the number of audit committee meetings held in a particular year (Vafeas, 1999). Prior 
research has argued that the board’s functions occur at the committee level (Kesner, 1988), 
with the audit committee being particularly relevant to financial issues such as earnings accu-
racy (Xie, Davidson, & DaBalt, 2003).
Control Variables
In addition to industry- and firm-level complexities, information asymmetry between 
management and outsiders can also arise from firms possessing intangible resources such as 
knowledge (Ndofor & Levitas, 2004). Following He and Wang (2009), we controlled for 
information asymmetry arising from intangible resources using R&D intensity (Aboody & 
Lev, 2000). Prior research has established the effect of CEO compensation on behavior 
(Devers et al., 2007). We also controlled for the total compensation paid to the CEO each 
year. Since our measure of industry complexity is based on a measure of industry concentra-
tion, consistent with prior literature, we controlled for the number of firms in each industry.
Although CEOs have considerable discretion in guiding their firms, there are a number 
of control structures that can limit their scope of action. Research has shown that more pow-
erful CEOs are more likely to have the ability to circumvent such measures (Finkelstein & 
Hambrick, 1989; Ocasio, 1994; Shen, 2003). We controlled for this with several variables. 
First, the level of power associated with the CEOs is in part reflected by whether or not they 
also serve as board chairpersons. We therefore controlled for CEO duality. Furthermore, 
longer tenured CEOs have more discretionary power than do newer ones (Finkelstein, 1992). 
Thus, we also controlled for CEO tenure. In addition, we controlled for the CEO’s equity in 
the firm by including the percentage of shares outstanding owned by the CEO. We con-
trolled for audit committee independence, which reflects the audit committee’s capacity to 
monitor the firm’s financial operations (Dalton et al., 2008). Audit committee independence 
was measured by the number of audit committee members not appointed to the board by the 
current CEO (Pollock, Fischer, & Wade, 2002; Westphal & Zajac, 1998; Xie et al., 2003). 
We also controlled for the entire BoD’s vigilance by including the number of BoD meetings 
held each year and for BoD independence through the number of outside directors.
Performance shortfalls have been shown to also affect the propensity of firms to misstate 
their earnings (Harris & Bromiley, 2007). We therefore controlled for a shortfall from the 
previous year’s performance by using the year-to-year decline in the firm’s return on assets 
(ROA). This was calculated by subtracting the ROA for the given year from the ROA of the 
previous fiscal year. A higher number indicates the current year ROA is worse than the 
previous year ROA. Proir research has shown that a change in firm performance often leads 
to opportunistic actions by management, including financial misconduct (Arthaud-Day et al., 
2006; Harris & Bromiley, 2007; O’Connor et al., 2006; Zhang et al., 2008). To ensure causal 
attributions, all independent and control variables are measured for the year prior to the mis-
stated earnings (t - 1).
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics and correlations for the variables included in this 
study. All variables included in interactions were mean centered (Aiken & West, 1991) and 
are reported as such in Table 1.
Data Analysis and Results
Our main objectives were to test the effect of complexity-induced information asymmetry 
on the probability of fraudulently misstating earnings, and also to test the hypothesized 
moderating roles of CEOs’ unexercised options and monitoring by the BoD. CEOs’ com-
pensation, however, is also influenced by (among other variables) information asymmetry. 
Indeed, there is a vast literature establishing the effect of information asymmetry on govern-
ance and compensation structure (e.g., Healy & Palepu, 2001; He & Wang, 2009). This 
indicates that decisions concerning the moderating variables—represented by the number of 
unexercised options held by the CEO and the number of BoD audit committee meetings—
could be endogenous. We therefore used a two-stage model (Greene, 2000) to test our 
hypotheses. The first stage consisted of predicting unexercised options at time (t - 1) and 
audit committee meetings, based on industry complexity, firm complexity, options granted, 
performance, CEO tenure, and other governance variables at time (t - 2). The predicted 
values from stage one along with the other independent variables were then used in stage 
two. In stage two, we used conditional logistic regression (Agresti, 2002) to test our hypoth-
eses, because it is most appropriate for analyzing matched-pair models with a binary depend-
ent variable (Hoetker, 2007; Press & Wilson, 1978).
Table 2 reports our conditional logistic regression results. Model 1 represents the control 
variables only, Model 2 includes main effects, Model 3 presents the interaction effects, and 
Model 4 presents the odds ratios of the complete model. All models are statistically signifi-
cant. All variables used in interactions (number of unexercised options, audit committee 
meetings, diversification, and industry complexity) were mean centered prior to the analyses 
(Aiken & West, 1991).
Hypothesis 1 predicted a positive relationship between the degree of complexity-based 
information asymmetry and the probability of financial restatement due to fraudulent report-
ing. Information asymmetry was measured at the industry level by industry complexity and 
at the firm level by firm complexity. The coefficients for both measures of information 
asymmetry—industry complexity (.47, p < .05) and firm complexity (.54, p < .01)—are positive 
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Table 2
Results of Conditional Logistic Regression for Firm Financial Restatements
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Odd Ratio
CEO Duality .28 .35 .25 1.29
CEO Tenure –.02* –.02 .01 1.00
CEO Total Compensation –.00 –.00 –.00 .99
CEO Shares Owned .03** .02* .04* 1.04*
Board Meetings .04 .04 .08** 1.09**
Board Independence –.02 –.11* –.06 .93
Audit Committee Independence –.38 –.46 –.68* .50
R&D Intensity –3.02 –2.30 –1.39 .24
Decline in ROA –.03* –.04** –.04* .95*
Number of Firms in Industry –.001 –.001** –.001* .99*
CEO Unexercised Options –.001* –.001*** .99***
Audit Committee Meetings .05 .75* 2.13*
Industry Complexity .47* .40* .40*
Firm Complexity .54** .71* 1.48*
Unexercised Options × Industry Complexity .01*** 1.00***
Unexercised Options × Firm Complexity .00 1.00
Audit Committee Meetings × Industry Complexity –.21 0.80
Audit Committee Meetings × Firm Complexity –.62** .53**
χ² 28.61** 41.45** 49.72**
Change in χ² 12.84 8.27
McFadden’s Pseudo R2 .13 .21 .27
–2 Log Likelihood 147.41 118.21 118.21
Hit Rate 62% 66% 69%
Note: N = 906. ROA = return on assets. Odds Ratio column results are for Model 3.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001 (one-tailed significance tests for Model 2 and Model 3).
and statistically significant as predictors of the likelihood of fraudulent financial reports 
(Model 2). These results provide strong support for H1. A Wald test was run to determine 
whether industry complexity and firm complexity have similar effects on the likelihood of a 
firm reporting fraudulent financial information. No statistical difference was found between 
the coefficients (χ² (1) = 0.59, p > .44), indicating that the effects are of similar magnitude.
Hypothesis 2 predicted that a greater number of unexercised options owned by the CEO 
would strengthen the positive relationship between information asymmetry and the probabil-
ity of financial misreporting. Model 3 provides the results for this hypothesis. From Model 
3, the coefficient for the interaction term between unexercised CEO stock options and indus-
try complexity is positive and significant (.005, p < .001), thus providing support to H2. The 
coefficient for the interaction term between CEO options and firm complexity, however, is 
not significant (.002, p < .1). As such, H2 receives only partial support.
Hypothesis 3 predicted that more stringent audit committee monitoring would weaken the 
positive relationship between information asymmetry and the probability of financial misre-
porting. From Model 3, the coefficient for the interaction term between audit committee 
meetings and firm-level complexity is negative and significant (–0.62, p < .01). This 
provides support for H3. However, the coefficient for the interaction term between audit 
committee meetings and industry complexity is not significant. Thus, H3 is also only par-
tially supported. To see if the moderating effect of governance is limited only to incentives 
(options) and monitoring (audit committee), in supplementary analyses we tested the inter-
action effects of both complexity measures with the other governance measures used as 
control variables.1 None of those interactions was significant, indicating that the relationship 
between information asymmetry and fraudulent financial reporting is moderated primarily 
through incentives and more stringent monitoring.
The proper interpretation of these interactions requires an examination of the interaction 
graphs shown in Figures 1 and 2. Figure 1 reveals that as industry complexity increases, the 
probability of fraudulent financial reporting increases for firms with CEOs having more 
unexercised options but is lower for those with fewer unexercised options. Conversely, 
Figure 2 shows that as firm complexity increases, the probability of fraudulent financial 
reporting also increases for firms with less frequent audit committee meetings. These results 
support the hypotheses that more CEO options increase the motivation for financial report-
ing fraud when opportunity from industry complexity is high, and more vigilant monitoring 
reduces the probability of financial reporting fraud even when the underlying opportunity 
due to information asymmetry from industry complexity is high.
Discussion
This study extends the current research on financial misconduct (e.g., O’Connor et al., 
2006; Zhang et al., 2008) by examining the relative effects of complexity-induced informa-
tion asymmetries on the likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting by top executives. 
Financial misconduct is a qualitatively different and potentially more egregious form of 
Figure 1
The Moderating Influence of CEO Unexercised Options on the Relationship Between 
Industry Complexity and Probability of Restating Earnings
opportunism than are simple shirking or the manipulation of strategic actions, because hon-
est financial reports are fundamental to robust and efficient equity markets.
We contribute to the management literature by arguing that although previous research 
has linked CEO power and incentive compensation to fraudulent earnings manipulations 
(O’Conner et al., 2006; Zhang et al., 2008), these are not sufficient conditions for financial 
reporting fraud. Instead, information asymmetry is the fundamental, yet generally little 
examined, antecedent condition required, and the greater the asymmetry the greater is the 
likelihood of top management fraud. These results support our contention that when share-
holders have less information about the firm, managers have greater opportunity to engage 
in fraudulent activities such as earnings management and financial misstatements (Richardson, 
2000), as suggested by those who argue that managers hold considerably more knowledge 
about the firm’s operations than do shareholders (Seyhun, 1986, 1990).
The delegation of managerial control in exchange for residual claims induces agency 
costs because the managerial specialization required for efficiency is the start toward 
increasingly complex firms. More firm-level complexity results in greater information 
asymmetry that can be capitalized upon by self-serving executives, just as more industry-
level complexity does. Such information asymmetry provides opportunities for fraud, without 
which the motivation provided by incentive compensation can’t be exploited by “unprinci-
pled” agents.
Moreover, our moderating findings indicate that not all contexts of similar information 
asymmetry must yield similar fraud likelihoods. Active audit committee monitoring, for 
example, reduces the positive effect of industry complexity–induced information asymmetry 
on the likelihood of financial fraud by top managers. Thus, corporate governance can play 
an important role. This finding is consistent with the New York Stock Exchange and 
National Association of Securities Dealers Blue Ribbon Commission on Financial Fraud’s 
Figure 2
The Moderating Influence of Number of Audit Committee Meetings on the 
Relationship Between Industry Complexity and Probability of Restating Earnings
conclusion (SEC Press Release, 1998) that aggressive monitoring by audit committees is the 
first line of defense against financial reporting fraud.
Our results for financial fraud can be compared to those of He and Wang (2009) regard-
ing firm performance. They studied the effects of information asymmetry, represented by the 
firm’s tacit knowledge base, on firms’ stock market performance and evaluated the moderat-
ing effects of compensation and monitoring on that focal relationship. For their multiyear 
sample of 215 manufacturing firms, they found that information asymmetry was positively 
related to firm performance, and also that compensation strengthened and monitoring weak-
ened the information asymmetry–performance relationship. Viewed together with our 
results, this would imply that while information asymmetry is associated with increased firm 
performance, it also increases the likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting by top manage-
ment. Similarly, while stock options positively affect and board monitoring negatively 
affects stock market performance as information asymmetry increases, they also positively 
and negatively affect the likelihood of financial fraud. In short, the He and Wang (2009) 
moderating results for the stock market performance dependent variable are the same as our 
moderating results for fraudulent financial performance.
To gain further information on how our results for fraudulent financial reporting might 
be related to those of He and Wang (2009) for stock performance, we performed a supple-
mentary analysis using stock market performance at t (the restatement year) as the dependent 
variable (i.e., the same measure used by He and Wang, 2009), to see if the results in our 
sample for market performance would be similar to those found by He and Wang. These 
results are presented in Table 3. Our Table 3 results show that the main effects of CEO 
options and BoD monitoring (number of board meetings) on subsequent market performance 
are positive and negative, respectively, in our sample. These results are somewhat consistent 
with those of He and Wang (2009), who found that tacit knowledge-based information 
asymmetry was positively related to financial performance in their sample and that CEO 
options enhanced that relationship while BoD monitoring suppressed it. Thus, our analyses 
provides some support for He and Wang’s (2009) findings while also showing that the same 
factors that influenced stock market performance in their sample and in our supplementary 
analysis also contributed to increased likelihoods of fraudulent financial reporting in our 
main analysis.
While our supplementary analysis provides some support for the earlier He and Wang 
(2009) work and adding confidence in our results because we found both the fraud effects 
and the opposite market effects in our sample, any conclusions drawn from comparisons of 
our findings with He and Wang (2009) require extreme care for several reasons. First, He 
and Wang (2009) focused on information asymmetry associated with the tacit and idiosyn-
cratic nature of a firm’s innovative assets. Prior research has argued for performance advan-
tages provided by the information asymmetry surrounding the creation and deployment of 
such assets (Ndofor & Levitas, 2004). Our study, on the other hand, focused on information 
asymmetry emanating from industry- and firm-level complexities, and prior research has 
shown that such complexities increase moral hazard and thus agency costs (Kim, Hoskisson, 
& Wan, 2004). Thus, the effect of information asymmetry on a firm’s market performance 
or fraud likelihood may depend upon the source of that information asymmetry. Second, 
while He and Wang’s (2009) sample consisted solely of manufacturing firms, our sample 
Table 3
Results of Regression for Market Performance (t + 1)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Beta
Constant .63** .53** .53**
CEO Duality .07 .04 .04 .03
CEO Tenure .01 .00 .00 .00
CEO Total Compensation .00* .00* .00** .10
CEO Shares Owned -.01** -.00 -.00 -.03
Decline in ROA -.00 .00 .00 -.00
Audit Committee Independence .05 .05 .05 .03
R&D Intensity 1.02*** 1.04*** 1.04*** .30
Number of Board Meetings -.05* -.01* -.01* -.07
Board Independence -.06*** -.05*** -.05*** -.16
Number of Industry Firms .00*** .00*** .00*** .17
Options Granted CEO .00 .00* .09
Audit Committee Meetings .10*** .11*** .16
Industry Complexity -.14*** -.13** -.12
Firm Complexity -.18*** -.17*** -.14
Audit Committee Meetings × Industry Complexity -.01 -.01
Audit Committee Meetings × Firm Complexity -.02 -.02
Options Granted CEO × Industry Complexity -.00* -.07
Options Granted CEO × Firm Complexity -.00 -.01
R2 .16 .20 .21
Adjusted R2 .15 .19 .19
Change in R2 .04** .00
F 13.67** 12.95** 10.29**
Note: N = 906. ROA = return on assets. Beta column results are for Model 3.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
has other firm types. And third, our sample is greatly over-weighted with 50% firms that 
fraudulently reported financial results. In such samples any market or accounting measures 
of performance cannot be considered to have even typical levels of accuracy.
Our study and the study of He and Wang (2009) produced differing recommendations for 
practitioners: Theirs indicate that stock options are positive and board monitoring negative 
for stock market performance, and ours indicate that stock options increase and board 
monitoring decreases the likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting. These competing pre-
scriptions raise the Goldilocks-like question, What levels of options and BoD monitoring, at 
each level of information asymmetry, will produce the best balance between market perfor-
mance and fraud likelihood? This question is similar to issues raised long ago by Hedberg, 
Nystrom, and Starbuck (1976) about organizations “camping on seesaws.” That is, organi-
zational success requires numerous balancing acts. Our results suggest that stock options can 
be effective up to some level, beyond which the likelihood of fraud (or other excessive risk 
taking (see Sanders & Hambrick, 2007) will become too great. Similarly, board monitoring 
can be effective up to some level, beyond which it may reduce flexibility and stifle perfor-
mance (He & Wang, 2009). This calls for careful judgment on the part of practitioners and, 
especially BoDs, and also indicates the need for continued research.
Limitations and Future Research
As with any study, ours has limitations. First, our arguments focus on the potential for 
opportunism that emanates from industry- and firm-based complexities. Complexity may 
also influence outcomes in a similar way due to the bounded rationality of managers. That 
is, as industries and organizations become more complex, the information managers must 
gather, analyze, and use in decision making increases exponentially and presents difficulties 
for CEOs and other top managers (Mesquita & Brush, 2008). Thus, while our sample selec-
tion ensured that the misstated earnings we analyzed were the result of potential fraud, it is 
also possible that misstated earnings could be as a result of “honest incompetence” (Hendry, 
2002) arising from increasing complexity rather than intentional fraudulent activity. This is 
less likely, however, because fraudulent misstatements are hardly ever misstated in the 
downward (i.e., below actual) direction. Nevertheless, future research could examine a wider 
array of misstated earnings to parcel out the relative effects of bounded rationality due to 
error, incompetence, or perhaps wishful thinking versus opportunism-based fraud.
Second, we only considered two possible sources of information asymmetry: industry- 
and firm-level complexity. Future research should consider other sources of information 
asymmetry that could increase the opportunities for fraud. This may allow for research to be 
conducted that examines Ghoshal and Moran’s (1996) assertion that deviant executives will 
continually find new ways to take advantage of their principals. Third, our study focuses on 
earnings restatements, which, by their nature, make it difficult to evaluate the precise size 
and scope of fraudulent activities by top managers. When a restatement occurs, the likeli-
hood of a further restatement also increases (Zhang et al., 2008), and because of this, we 
could not be confident enough in the amount restated to confidently identify frauds of dif-
ferent absolute or relative sizes. This could be a fruitful area for future research.
Fourth, we only include governance mechanisms that have been shown in prior research 
to influence earnings misstatement. There are, however, a broader set of governance mecha-
nisms that may also influence CEO behavior. For example, we measure monitoring using 
board and audit committee independence and number of meetings. However, ownership by 
large blockholders and certain institutional owners (Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, & Grossman, 
2002), the market for corporate control (Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 2003), capital structure 
(David, O’Brien, & Yoshikawa, 2008), and the reputation of board members (Zajac & 
Westphal, 1996) all have been shown to have a constraining effect on CEO behavior. Future 
research could enrich the field by examining how these governance mechanisms interact 
with information asymmetry to influence CEO behaviors.
Finally, our measure of industry complexity is based on the four-firm concentration ratio 
of the industry. Although this is the predominantly used measure in the literature, other 
measures are also present. For example, Boyd (1995) used the Herfindahl index—measured 
as the sum of squared market shares of all firms in the industry—to calculate industry com-
plexity. Heeley et al. (2007) measured industry complexity using a binary variable based on 
International Standard Industry Classification (ISIC) codes that capture the ease with which 
external parties such as analysts, investors, and other stakeholders make a link between 
resources, competitive activity, and the performance of firms in the industries. We reran our 
analyses using both alternative measures with no substantive difference in results. The pres-
ence of multiple measures, however, raises the issue of multiple sources of complexity 
within the industry. While our measure and that of Boyd (1995) capture complexity resulting 
from competition within the industry, Heeley et al.’s (2007) measure captures complexity 
originating from the nature of operations of firms in the industry. Other possible sources of 
industry complexity also include technological complexity and regulatory/legal complexity. 
Future research can advance the field by investigating if the different sources of complexity 
give rise to the same levels of information asymmetry and whether they would have the same 
impact on both managerial and firm behavior.
Conclusion
We have argued that management scholars should investigate opportunity construct more 
rigorously, in addition to executives’ motives and willingness, because opportunity is both 
a necessary and a sufficient condition for financial malfeasance. Moreover, future studies 
will require the testing of each construct’s main and interactive effects if the inconsistencies 
among prior results are to be resolved.
Our study indicates that principals must continuously re-evaluate the combination of 
controls to monitor agents and incentives used to align interests and reduce moral hazard. 
For instance, Zhang and colleagues (2008) discussed restricted stock as a potential alterna-
tive to stock options as incentive-based compensation because it has different risk-reward 
characteristics. Other possibilities include the use of “clawback” provisions where execu-
tives would be forced to return incentive compensation if financial manipulation is discov-
ered, and the rewarding of bonuses paid on the basis of long-term metrics rather than annual 
returns. We hope that future researchers will be able to take steps toward identifying the 
appropriate fulcrum points for options and BoD monitoring that, at each level of information 
asymmetry, most effectively balance concerns for raising performance with concerns for 
reducing the likelihood that “unprincipled agents” (O’Connor et al., 2006) will be able to 
serve their own interests at the expense of their shareholders.
Note
1. We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
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